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ABSTRACT 
 
THE IMPACTS OF PROCUREMENT POLICY CHANGES ON DEFENSE  
STOCKS: EVIDENCE FROM THE US DEFENSE INDUSTRY 
 
Mintaş, Feyzi 
M.B.A.,Department of  Management  
Supervisor: Assist.Prof. Aydın Yüksel 
September 2003 
 
          The purpose of this study is to examine the relative stock market performance 
of US defense stocks over different time periods and analyze the impact of changes 
in Federal Acquisition Policy on defense stock returns. The data set covers monthly 
returns of 67 defense stocks during the period 1945-2000. The analysis consists of 
two parts. Relative performance analysis and the event study analysis. The results of 
the relative performance analysis showed that defense stocks portfolio is both more 
profitable and riskier than the size based benchmark. However, the difference was 
not found to be statistically significant. On the other hand, the event study analysis 
indicates that defense firms significantly reacted to nine major regulatory changes 
that occurred during the sample period. Only two of the nine regulatory changes 
examined resulted in statistically significant average excess returns. For other 
regulations, the sign and the magnitude of the reaction varies across firms.  
Keywords: Defense industry, defense procurement, event study, multivariate 
regression model. 
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ÖZET 
TEDARİK POLİTİKALARINDAKİ DEĞİŞİKLİKLERİN SAVUNMA 
SANAYİİNE ETKİLERİ:  AMERİKA ÖRNEĞİ 
 
Feyzi MİNTAŞ 
YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ, İŞLETME FAKÜLTESİ  
Tez danışmanı: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Aydın YÜKSEL 
Eylül, 2003 
 
          Bu çalışmanın amacı Amerikan savunma sanayii hisselerinin değişik 
periyotlardaki rölatif performansını ve tedarik politikasında meydana gelen başlıca  
değişikliklerin savunma sanayii hisselerine olan etkilerini araştırmaktır. Data seti,  67 
savunma sanayii şirketinin 1945-2000 yılları arasındaki aylık getirilerini 
kapsamaktadır. Analizler iki parçadan oluşmaktadır: Rölatif performans analizi ve 
olay etki analizi. Rölatif performans analizleri savunma sanayii şirketlerinden oluşan 
portföyün benzer bir piyasa değerine sahip olan diğer bir portföyden daha karlı ve 
daha riskli olduğu sonucuna varmıştır. Fakat iki portföy arasındaki fark istatistiksel 
olarak belirgin bulunmamıştır. Olay etki analizi, savunma sanayii şirketlerinin 9 ana 
kanunsal düzenlemeye belirgin olarak reaksiyon gösterdiğini bulmuştur. 9 kanunsal 
düzenlemeden yalnızca ikisinde istatistiksel olarak ortalama anormal getiriler 
belirgin bulunmuştur. Savunma sanayii firmaları diğer kanunsal düzenlemelere 
heterojen bir reaksiyon göstermiştir; reaksiyonun büyüklüğü, pozitif veya negatif 
oluşu firmadan firmaya farklılık göstermiştir. 
Anahtar kelimeler: Savunma sanayii,  Savunma tedariki, olay etki analizi, çok 
değişkenli regresyon modeli 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
          The presence of a large defense industry in an economy, as the one in the US, 
traditionally raises the issue of whether such an industry profits from the misery of 
others. That is why defense industries are sometimes called as ‘merchants of dead’ or 
‘war profiteers’. In the US, there has frequently been a great deal of discussion in 
private and official circles about the profitability of defense business over time. A 
popular opinion that defense profits are excessive is based largely on occasional 
public reports of wastes and inefficiencies over different time periods. According to 
Bohi (1973) the issue is of critical importance, for if profit rates are too high the 
nation is wasting resources, while if profit rates are too low, resources will flow out 
of defense business and jeopardize the quantity and quality of sources of supply.  
          Defense industry distinguishes itself from a typical industry in several ways: 
an unusual product market, heavy use of quickly changing technology, multiproduct 
firms, and regulation. This final characteristic will be addressed in this study.        
          The purpose of this study is to examine the long-run stock market performance 
of US defense stocks over different time periods and analyze the impact of changes 
in Federal Acquisition Policy on defense stock returns. Acquisition policy, which is 
the focus of this study, is just one of the factors that affect defense industry profits. 
Other factors can be the general demand for weapon systems, which may change due 
to political considerations and wars, the level of competition in the defense industry 
or the speed of technological improvements. This type of a study that measures the 
impact of specific events on the firm value is called  ‘event study’ in the literature. 
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          The empirical analysis consists of two parts: Examination of the relative profit 
performance of defense stocks and the event study analysis. To address the issue of 
excess defense profits, relative performance of defense stocks is examined over the 
period 1945-1999. This period is divided into five major sub-periods. A size 
benchmark portfolio is used to measure long-run excess returns. For the event study 
analysis, a version of the Multivariate Regression Model (MVRM) is used to 
measure the impact of regulatory changes on defense firms. MVRM is a popular way 
to deal with the clustering problem in standard event studies. Another advantage of 
MVRM compared to the standard methodology is that it allows the testing of a richer 
set of hypothesis. 
            The results of the relative performance analysis show that, in the long run 
(1945-1999), defense firms do not earn statistically significant excess profits. 
However, there is evidence that for specific and relatively short time periods, big 
defense firms are able reap excess profits. The results of the event study analysis 
indicate that defense firms reacted significantly to the regulatory changes examined 
in this study. However, out of nine regulatory changes examined, the reaction was 
homogenous in only two. These two changes affected the defense firms negatively. 
For other regulatory changes the sign and the magnitude of the impact varies across 
firms.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
DEFENSE INDUSTRY  
 
         This chapter is organized as follows: First, the military power concept and the 
means to obtain military power are explained. Second, the structure and major 
characteristics of defense industries are covered. The chapter concludes with the 
discussion of the US defense procurement. 
 
2.1 Military Power 
 
          Military power is a crucial tool in dealing with conflicts in international 
relations, together with political and economic power. The decision about having a 
strong military power, and a strong army depends on the following factors: 
• The perceived threats to the nation and a desire for security,  
• A desire for national power and international status, 
• The size of national income and wealth,  
          These factors consequently affect the military expenditure decisions, which 
varies a lot across countries. Table 1 depicts the top 15 countries regarding military 
expenditures. The five countries with the highest military expenditures are USA, 
Japan, UK, France and China. These countries (US alone) accounted for 62 (48) 
percent of world total in 2002. Military expenditures consist of operating costs, 
procurement and construction costs and research and development costs related to 
acquisition of defense products.  
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TABLE 1 
 
Top 15 Countries in Military Expenditures (2002) 
 
                                                      
Country                               Size      World share 
(%)                                    
USA 335.7 43 
Japan  
UK 
46.7 
36.0 
6 
5 
France 33.6 4 
China 31.1 4 
Sub-total top 5 483.1 62 
Germany 
S. Arabia 
Italy  
Iran 
21.1 
21.6 
21.1 
17.5 
4 
3 
3 
2 
South Korea 
Sub-total top 10 
13.5   
584.5 
2  
75 
India 12.9 2 
Russia  
Turkey  
Brazil 
11.4 
10.1 
10.0 
2 
1 
1 
Israel 9.8 1 
Sub-total top 15 638.7 82 
World 784 100 
Note: Numbers for size are in US Billions dollars               
Source: Military expenditure: Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 
Yearbook 2003. 
 
          Military power can be obtained by forming a strong army, making use of 
alliances, or both. A strong army requires necessary weapons. In order to obtain 
these weapons, countries have two alternatives. One is buying weapons from other 
countries; the other is developing a national defense industry. Military cooperation 
through alliances may lead to great savings in military expenditures. Each of them 
will be briefly discussed in the following sections. 
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2.1.1 Buying weapons from other countries 
 
 
           Today, the international arms market is a buyers’ market in which modern 
tanks, fighter aircrafts, submarines, missiles, and other weapons are, in general, 
available to any nation that can afford them. Increasingly, sales of major weapons 
also include the transfer of the underlying technologies necessary for local 
production, resulting in widespread proliferation of modern weapons and the means 
to produce and even develop them. For example, the Gulf War (1990-1991) showed 
that although Iraq had little or no defense industrial capability, it had been able to 
obtain a vast arsenal of modern weapons from the Soviet Union, Western Europe, 
China, Eastern Europe. 
          Although feasible, buying weapons from other countries can be too costly. In 
addition, the lack of a national defense industry leads to increasing dependence to 
other countries. There is an optimal point for each country related to production of 
weapons systems. Some arms products will inevitably be purchased from other 
countries, and some will be produced by the country.  The difficulties related to 
forming a national defense industry will be discussed later.  
          Table 2 displays the total exports of conventional weapons over the period 
1997-2001 by country. Conventional weapons are the weapons, which are not 
nuclear, biological or chemical. The figures in Table 2 show that the US has a 
dominant role in the weapons market. The US exceeds other important players in the 
market, namely Russia, France, the UK and Germany, by a wide margin. 
 6 
 
   
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1.2 Developing a National Defense Industry 
 
          A large number of governments support the indigenous development and 
production of weapons for several reasons. First, a high level of domestic 
production of arms is perceived as an important factor for guaranteeing autonomy in 
foreign policy. This factor can be called as the basic security value of self-reliance. 
No country wishes to be dependent on weapons from abroad if it can be avoided. 
Not surprisingly, the countries that have gone furthest in developing defense 
industries from scratch during the last decades are also the ones that have felt their 
security most acutely threatened. Israel, North Korea and Pakistan are examples of 
TABLE 2 
Top 15 Countries in Exports of Conventional 
Weapons 
 
Country                       Total Sales (1997-2001) 
USA 44.82 
Russia 17.35 
France 9.80 
UK 6.70 
Germany 4.82 
Ukraine 2.62 
Netherlands 1.86 
Italy 1.67 
China 1.55 
Belarus 1.52 
Sweden 1.2 
Israel 0.97 
Spain 0.87 
Canada 0.64 
Australia 0.62 
Note: All figures are US Billion Dollars.  
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute (SIPRI)  
 7 
these countries. Israel-Arabian, North Korea-South Korea and Pakistan-India 
conflicts forced these countries to form a defense industrial base.  
          Second, arms production is also believed to add to economic autonomy 
through its contribution to overall economic output, employment, and technological 
innovation. Moreover, spin-off from military technology to civilian industry has 
also been viewed as an essential driving force of national innovation and 
competitiveness.  
          Finally, a domestic defense industrial base can also be used as a tool in 
foreign and trade policies. A well-developed arms industry grants a government 
influence in military alliances and cooperative arms projects. Arms transfers can be 
used to support allies and to win friends as well as to improve the balance of 
payment.  
         Today, two major difficulties exist related to arms production. First one is the 
rapid development of military technology and the increasing R&D costs of 
advanced weapon systems. These factors have led to a high level of international 
interdepence in armaments production. Second one is the increasing competition 
especially after the end of cold war. The end of the Cold War has brought 
profoundly decreased demand for weapons by the United States, the Soviet Union, 
and most European governments. As a result of worldwide overcapacity in defense 
production, competition is fierce.  
 
2.1.3 Military Cooperation through Alliances 
 
          The issue of obtaining military power and the means to obtain necessary 
weapons, as discussed in previous sections, is a difficult task for any country. 
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Cooperation among countries may ease the task. For that purpose, many countries in 
the world seek alliances to ensure and safeguard their freedom and security in a more 
effective and less costly way. International security organizations like the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact have been important 
organizations in this respect. The former is a successful example while the latter is an 
unsuccessful one.  
         NATO is an alliance of 19 countries from North America and Europe and was 
established on 4 April 1949. In accordance with the Treaty, the fundamental role of 
NATO is to safeguard the freedom and security of its member countries by political 
and military means. During the last fifteen years, NATO has also played an 
increasingly important role in crisis management and peacekeeping. All member 
countries that participate in the military aspect of the Alliance contribute forces and 
equipment, which together constitute the integrated military structure of the Alliance. 
These forces and assets remain under national command and control until a time 
when NATO requires them for a specific purpose (i.e. conflict or crisis, 
peacekeeping). 
          The Warsaw Pact alliance was set up in 1955 by Albania, Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union. 
The organization was the Soviet block's equivalent of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization. A unified military command, with headquarters in Moscow, directed 
the united forces, which included Soviet divisions stationed in some of the member 
nations prior to the signing of the treaty. The 1989 collapse of the Communist 
governments in Eastern Europe made the treaty superfluous, as the new governments 
repudiated their former ally, the Soviet Union. The Warsaw Treaty Organization 
dissolved in June 1991. 
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          An attempt to form a new military alliance appeared in Europe recently. On 20 
November 2000, European Union Defense Ministers met in Brussels and agreed to 
the creation of a EU Rapid Reaction Force.  The EU force is not a standing army. It 
follows a similar character to NATO's Allied Command Europe (ACE) Rapid 
Reaction Corps (ARRC) where certain elements of member states armed forces are 
earmarked for rapid deployment if the need arises. 
 
2.2 Defense Industry 
 
          This section starts with a brief explanation regarding the structure of the 
defense industry. The rest of the discussion focuses on the characteristics of defense 
industries. 
 
2.2.1 Structure of Defense Industries 
 
          A significant of portion of defense industry in major arms-producing countries 
were managed and owned by national governments during the 20th century. In the 
structure of defense industry, the share of public sector and private sector changes 
according to a country’s political and economic structure in addition to the level of 
industrialization. In a country without a sufficient capital accumulation and a strong 
industrial base, it is unlikely to observe private firms. Even in those that met those 
criteria, governmental support is needed for the success of private firms. Only if 
enough incentives offered by the government to the private sector, will the private 
defense industry operate and grow.  
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          Generally defense industries in the world display a mixed structure. 
Government undertakes the production especially when the demand and profitability 
is low and when it is strategically undesirable to leave some products to private 
sector. Especially the production of weapons like rockets and ammunition cannot be 
orientated to private sector, thus it is supported by the government due to demand 
changes in time of war and peace. 
          There are three main models used in this field: 
1.GOGO (Government Owned Government Operated): Ownership and operation 
belongs to the government. 
2.GOCO (Government Owned Contractor Operated): Ownership belongs to the 
government but the operation of the establishment is left to the private sector. Such 
institutions do not operate when there is no demand but they are kept operatable. 
3.COCO (Contractor Owned Contractor Operated): These are the production lines 
operated when the government needs specific defense products. When there is an 
industry campaign they can be completely allocated to military production. 
 
2.2.2 Characteristics of Defense Industry 
 
           There are four important characteristics of defense industry (Demski and 
Magee (1992)): an unusual product market, heavy use of quickly changing 
technology, multiproduct firms, and regulation.  
          First, the product market is unusual on the demand side because it is 
dominated by a single customer: national government. There are also other 
customers, such as foreign countries, but the government dominates the market. 
Governments, in all parts of the world, generally exert complete control over the size 
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and timing of demand and indeed, whether there will be a market. Products usually 
do not even exist before they are needed or demanded by the government. Therefore 
the amount of risk and uncertainty involved in the defense business has often been 
considered higher than those in comparable commercial business. This demand side 
uncertainty depends on changes in the external threat, changes in the availability of 
substitute weapons or simply changes in governments’ willingness to purchase 
certain weapons. 
          Second, technology plays an important role in the industry. Heavy use of 
quickly changing technology increases the importance of research and development 
(R&D), which is a costly process. Therefore it is important to spread such high fixed 
costs over a large level of output. Moreover, there is uncertainty regarding the cost, 
the performance characteristics of the product as well as the feasibility of underlying 
technology. This product side uncertainty (internal uncertainty) further increases the 
total risk of defense industry. 
          Third, producers are usually multiproduct firms. Commercial products are 
present as well as various defense products. Some are developed for military 
purposes, such as combat aircraft, combat ships, armored vehicles, and guns. Others 
are produced for military purposes but can also be used for civilian purposes as well. 
Certain transport and communications equipment, logistical services and a wide 
range of general–purpose goods—such as food, clothing, fuel, and office equipment 
are examples. 
          Finally, the defense industry is heavily regulated. Governments regulate 
accounting practices, procurement standards, pricing and sourcing procedures and 
even the industry profits.        
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          To sum up, defense industry differentiates from non-defense sector in several 
aspects. In the following chapter, the focus will be on the US defense industry and 
the US procurement system.    
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CHAPTER 3 
 
DEFENSE PROCUREMENT AND REGULATION IN THE US 
 
          The structure of this chapter is as follows: The first section presents a brief 
explanation related to the US defense industry. The second section covers the US 
procurement system. The chapter concludes with the discussion the regulation and 
defense profits in the US. 
 
1.1 US Defense Industry 
          As was suggested by Table 2, the US has a large and strong defense industry. 
Several laws and regulations give the president and congress extensive authority 
regarding the development, production and procurement of defense systems. The 
laws in the US hinder the sale or merger of critical defense systems to foreign firms. 
In addition, Buy American Act is valid. For military products that is procured by the 
government, it means a foreign ask should be at least 50 percent lower than a 
domestic ask to be accepted.  
          Nonetheless, the US Department of Defense supports international 
partnerships by American defense companies, where they coincide with US security 
policy goals or allow US production lines to remain open. US global partnerships can 
be divided into three groups: Wholly owned subsidiaries, Joint ventures and 
Government to government programs. 
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         Wholly owned subsidiaries: 
         In countries where foreign ownership of defense companies is permitted, the 
establishment of wholly owned subsidiaries is a popular route for US defense 
companies seeking a local presence. This allows them to claim "local identity" in 
competitions with national leaders of defense industry, without having to enter into 
complex joint venture arrangements.  
          Joint ventures: 
          In many countries (e.g. Middle Eastern countries), the outright foreign 
ownership of defense interests is prohibited. These restrictions have forced American 
defense companies to enter into joint ventures with local companies. Most of these 
programs have their origin in the Cold War era and many US companies have had 
mixed results from them in recent years. As defense spending has declined over the 
last decade, US government aid and local funding for co-production projects has 
dried up.  
          Government to government programs: 
          It is increasingly common for governments to pool resources with allies to 
fund the development of hi-tech defense equipment. The most important example of 
this is the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), which has brought several foreign governments 
on board as partners and observers.  
 
 
 
 15 
3.2 US Defense Procurement 
          Procurement can be described as the process of obtaining services, supplies, 
and equipment in conformance with applicable laws and regulations in the Federal 
Government. Procurement is widely used by government agencies and private firms 
to perform their research, development and production projects. The relationship 
between the buyer and the seller is in general partly governed by a contract. 
          The aim of Defense Procurement in the US is to ensure Department of Defense 
(DOD) contracts and business arrangements provide the best quality weapons, 
equipment, and services for defense in a timely manner at the lowest affordable cost 
to the taxpayer, consistent with public laws. The Department of Defense is the only 
authority in defense procurement. 
          Defense Procurement has several informational and incentive problems arising 
out of the complexity of products purchased. Firstly, defense contractors possess 
private information on technology and cost parameters. This gives them an 
informational advantage that they would use to extract rents. This problem is called 
as the self-selection problem. Secondly, contractors’ actions are highly costly to 
monitor. Hence, appropriate incentives must be provided to elicit the best actions for 
the purchaser to avoid the moral hazard problem. Thirdly, huge uncertainties exist, 
both on the demand and supply sides, so that risk-taking is a major entrepreneurial 
problem. Fourthly, R&D is a major output and hence a major measurement challenge 
for the purchaser. Finally, appropriate incentives must be provided to the firms 
engaged in unique projects. This problem is called the hold-up problem.  
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          The life cycle of a defense procurement program can be divided into three 
phases. In the design phase, multiple firms pursue competing designs. This process 
often begins with five or more firms, and then decreases to a smaller number. DOD 
funds most of this research directly. The second phase is selecting the sole source for 
production. In this phase, firms submit prototypes and final design plans to DOD and 
typically bid on the next increment of work, which involves finalizing the design, 
establishing the production line, and producing the first items. Contracts are made in 
this phase with the firms. The third phase is production, which may last a decade or 
more. Prices in the production phase are generally cost-based. 
          Before a discussion of the contracting mechanism in defense procurement, it is 
useful to review two major contract types described in Federal Acquisition 
Regulations (FAR, 1984). Federal Acquisition Regulations cover all kinds of 
government acquisitions.  
 
          Fixed-Price Contracts: 
          Fixed-price contracts require the contractor to deliver the supplies on time and 
within the price restraints of the contract. These contracts place most of the burden of 
risk on the contractor. Therefore, contractors will not be interested in fixed-price 
contracts unless the uncertainties associated with performance are at a manageable 
and predictable level.  
          Cost-Reimbursement Contracts:  
          The Government pays all allowable contract costs when contracts in this 
category are used. These contracts are primarily used when there is no valid basis for 
estimating performance costs. Negotiations establish an estimated cost that will be 
the basis for obligating funds and will act as a ceiling that the contractor may not 
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exceed without risk. This means the contractor incur expenses in excess of the 
established cost estimate. Cost-reimbursement contracts impose an administrative 
burden on both the Government and the contractor, requiring careful surveillance and 
auditing of costs. These contracts are appropriate for research and development 
because of the technical and price uncertainty. 
          In defense procurement, DOD currently uses a version of the cost-
reimbursement contracts. This contract type is described in Truth in Negotiation Act 
(TINA). In a TINA contract, the firm estimates the cost for production and signs a 
certificate to its accuracy. If the firm produces the product below estimated costs, it 
must refund the difference to the government. Therefore TINA contract functions 
like a cost-reimbursement contract. The firm is subject to audit for accuracy and can 
face criminal prosecution if there is an unreported discrepancy favorable to the firm. 
The reason for these stringent policies within the TINA contracting process is 
“asymmetrical information.” The contractor doesn’t know the exact price of 
manufacturing a product, the firm most likely does. TINA is designed, therefore, to 
protect DOD from overpricing due to this lack of information.  
           Nonetheless, TINA contract has also been subject to criticism. For example, 
Rogerson (1999) argues that through its protective mechanisms for accurate pricing, 
TINA inhibits incentives for firm efficiencies. DOD cannot monitor a firm’s 
“unobservable effort:” how efficiently and with what quality a firm works on the 
product. Because all under-expenditures must be refunded to the government, the 
firm has no incentive to work harder and lower production costs. If a fixed-price 
contract option is given to the contractor, the manufacturing of the product would be 
more efficient. In a fixed-price contract, DOD would price low, but still high enough 
for firms to capture gains by increasing their efficiency. Because the price is fixed, 
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the firm keeps profits made through its unobservable efforts. If the firm chooses not 
to take the fixed-price contract, it can still turn back on the cost-based TINA 
contract.  
          Obviously, defense procurement, which is subject to Federal Acquisition 
Regulations, affects the profits of defense firms. This fact points to the significance 
of regulation in defense industry. Therefore, in the next chapter regulation and profits 
in defense industry will be reviewed. 
 
3.3 Regulation and Defense Profits in US Defense Industry 
 
         Since the defense industry is a regulated industry it can be expected that the 
regulatory changes affect the future expected cash flows of related defense firms. 
There is indeed empirical evidence in the literature that such regulatory activities 
have considerable impacts on the market value of defense firms. A good example 
can be the study by Pownall (1986). He examined the shareholder wealth effects of 
accounting changes made by Cost Accounting Standards Board. Stock prices of 
defense firms reacted negatively to the debates of changes in legislative standards. It 
means that market perceived these changes as a deterrent to their profits. Every 
reform or act that is brought up about the acquisition process aims to make the 
process more efficient, thus, has a potential to reduce directly firms’ operating cash 
flows. On the other hand, these regulatory changes may have positive impacts as 
well. The impact may change according to the properties of the legislation. 
        There is a strategic importance for the US to have a leading defense industry. 
On the other hand, large amounts of money spent on military equipment naturally 
attracts public attention. According to Bohi (1973) the issue is of critical 
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importance, for if profit rates are too high the nation is wasting resources and 
taxpayers are overburdened, while if profit rates are too low, resources will flow out 
of defense business and jeopardize the quantity and quality of sources of supply.              
         Throughout the history there has always been a natural discussion about the 
profits of defense contractors. After World War 2, it was said that defense firms had 
earned excess profits due to urgent demand for weapons and other military products 
during the war. These discussions led to the foundation of the renegotiation board. 
The renegotiation board was established under the renegotiation act of 1951. The 
aim of the board was to insure that contractors do not reap unusual profits.    
        To understand what the renegotiation board does, there is a need to clarify 
the profit-limitation process in the defense sector. Rogerson (1994) points to two 
phases of profit limitation. The first phase is the negotiation of individual contracts 
by the procurement agencies and the contractors. At this point the profit on each 
contract is established ex ante, usually as a component of the total estimated cost 
(price) of the contract. Disputes that arise at contract settlement over allowable costs 
and fees are usually settled by negotiation. In some cases this fails and parties go to 
the Armed Forces Board of Contract Appeal. The second phase is profit 
renegotiation, an ex post review of a contractor’s total profit from all contracts 
during his fiscal year. This is the responsibility of the Renegotiation Board, which is 
independent of procurement agencies. When the board finds excess profits in its 
review, it recaptures them, either by agreement or by order. Contractors may 
petition the United States Court of Claims for a redetermination of the issue if they 
feel that the conclusion is unfair. 
        To perform its function, legislation that established the board must 
necessarily determine whether unusual (or excess) profits exist. Agapos and 
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Gallaway (1970) discuss the criteria that the board considers in order to determine 
this issue. These criteria can be summarized as follows: 
• The reasonableness of costs to the government 
• Contractor profits based on net worth and the amount of capital 
employed in the productive process 
• The extent of the risk entailed in the activity  
• The character and complexity of the techniques used to produce the 
product 
• Considerations of the public interest 
        The effectiveness of the board was evaluated empirically by Agapos and 
Gallaway (1970) and rationale of the board as a regulatory device in the aerospace 
industry has been found debatable. 
        The debate did not stop after the establishment of the renegotiation board and 
there appeared a need for more efficient acquisition policies that will neither lead to 
waste of public resources nor eliminate all the profits in the defense industry. This 
accelerated the efforts for reforming the federal acquisition policy. As explained in 
the previous chapter, federal acquisition is a more general concept. It comprises the 
regulations related to non-defense acquisition as well as defense acquisition. 
However, in federal spending on goods and services, the Department of Defense 
plays a dominant role, accounting for two-thirds of all federal acquisition spending. 
        There have been several major acquisition reform initiatives in history and 
these are likely to affect the profits of defense industry. These reforms have been 
motivated by several factors. The first factor is the perceived contractor waste, fraud 
and abuse that led to regulations regarding the contracting mechanism. The second 
factor is the efforts to centralize the acquisition decision-making process. This factor 
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is motivated by the complexity and confusion surrounding the procurement system. 
Finally the last factor is the desire for increasing the competition in the acquisition 
environment. The major reforms will be discussed in chapter 5. 
            To sum up, defense industry has been the focus of discussions in private and 
official circles. The question was whether excess profits exist in the industry. The 
next chapter gives a review of literature on defense procurement and profits of US 
defense contractors. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
           There are several studies related to the defense industry, the defense 
procurement and specifically to the profits of US defense contractors. These studies 
point to different aspects of the topic and vary in terms of scope. The question of 
whether defense contractors earn greater returns than other companies is 
controversial, and despite numerous studies the issue remains unsettled. The 
disagreement is not surprising because studies in the literature are not comparable. 
They consider different groups of firms and different time periods, and they employ 
different measures of profitability (Trevino and Higgs 1992). These studies can be 
divided into three groups. The first group of articles directly tests the hypothesis that 
profitability of defense contractors is higher than that of other firms. The second 
group of articles examines the procurement process and offer alternative strategies 
for efficiency. Finally, the third group of studies investigates the reason why there 
may be excess profits in the defense industry. The reason for excess profits can be 
the procurement process itself. Thus, the process itself poses some problems. These 
studies test the so-called cost-shifting hypothesis, which is a result of joint costs 
problem in defense procurement. 
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4.1 Studies Related to Relative profit performance of Defense Firms 
 
          Before 1970, there are two important studies related to defense profits in the 
US. The first study is Weidenbaum (1968), which examines the profit rates (profits 
as a percentage of net worth) of six aerospace contractors doing more than 75 percent 
of their total business with the Department of Defense or NASA. The study 
compares sample firms with six commercial firms having similar total sales volumes 
based on profits over two time periods: 1952-1955 and 1962-1965. Weidenbaum 
study concludes that the defense business is more profitable than nondefense 
business and, argues that the defense industry is becoming more concentrated and as 
a result less competitive. The second study is that of Logistics Management Institute 
(LMI, 1969) for the Department of Defense. The LMI study concludes that, between 
1962 and 1968, profit rates of defense firms (as a percentage of net worth) are 
consistently lower than profit rates of a broad sample of commercially oriented firms. 
Moreover, the study finds a downward trend in industry profits since 1962 and 
argues that this is the result of increasing competition in the industry.  
          Agapos and Gallaway (1970) investigate defense firms’ profits over the period 
1942-1967 to see the effect of the renegotiation board. Their empirical model that 
explains profits includes a dummy variable to measure the effect of the renegotiation 
board. The coefficient of the renegotiation board dummy variable is insignificant 
showing that the presence of the renegotiation board does not affect the profits of 
defense firms. 
         Stigler and Friedland (1971) examine the profitability record of the defense 
business with regard to stock market performance over two periods, 1948-61 and 
1958-68. They find that during the first period defense firms outperformed the 
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market by a large margin, and the difference disappears in the second period. 
Therefore they conclude that the popular view of unusual profits of defense 
contractors is correct for the 1950s and incorrect for the 1960s. 
          Bohi (1973) examines the profit performance of defense industry firms to 
determine whether the profit rates of firms engaged heavily in defense contracting 
differ significantly from profit rates of non-defense oriented firms between 1960 and 
1969. On the basis of the sample of 36 defense contractors considered, he concludes 
that there is no evidence for arguing that the defense industry is more or less 
profitable than other industries in general.    
          Greer and Liao (1986) analyzed defense firms’ profits and risks between 1963 
and 1982. The study concludes that defense business has generally been less 
profitable than commercial business even though the risk level is higher.       
          Trevino and Higgs (1992) examine the profits of the top 50 defense contractors 
and compare them with the profits of comparable non-defense companies. They find 
that profit rates of defense contractors exceeded those of comparable non-defense 
companies during the period 1970-1989. Their conclusion holds regardless of 
whether profits are measured by the firms’ accounting rate of return or by the stock 
market payoff to shareholders in the form of dividends and capital gains. They also 
conclude that investing in defense contractors was not significantly riskier than 
investing in comparable non-defense companies. 
          Using longitudinal data on almost 9,300 industry segments from the compustat 
file, Lichtenberg (1992) tests and finds strong support for the hypothesis that 
government contractors (especially defense contractors) are more profitable than 
other firms. According to his estimates, from 1984 to 1989, the average annual profit 
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rate (return on assets) of these contractors as a whole is 68 to 72 percent higher than 
that of other segments.  
 
4.2 Studies related to defense procurement and its efficiency 
   
           Pownall (1986) examines the impact of regulatory changes that arise from the 
Cost Accounting Standards Board (CASB). In general, his results indicate that, at 
least for the less competitive defense contractors, security returns declined at the time 
of the initial debates concerning regulation of contractors’ cost accounting practices, 
indicating anticipated decreases in profitability associated with defense contracting 
activities. These results suggest that market agents viewed the accounting standard-
setting agency as a deterrent to at least some firms’ abilities to extract excessive cost 
reimbursements from the government.     
          Rogerson (1989) argues that informational and incentive constraints inherent 
in the innovation process require that regulatory institutions in defense procurement 
create prizes for innovation. He claims that since the quality of an innovation is 
difficult to describe or measure objectively, the most natural method for awarding 
prizes is to allow firms to earn positive economic profit on production contracts. He 
uses stock market data to estimate the size of the prize that firms compete for. His 
basic idea is to calculate the change in market values of firms competing for a prime 
contract award around the day it was announced which firm won. The values of the 
prizes on 12 major aerospace projects are found to be large. 
         Kovacic and Smallwood (1994) discuss the issue of mergers and acquisitions in 
the defense industry over the period 1992-1994. They discuss how DOD could 
preserve important rivalries through a competitive analysis of mergers. According to 
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them, if DOD would not develop an effective capability for analyzing the 
competitive effects of consolidation events, then either contractors would have free 
rein to determine the structure of the defense supplier base, or the task would fall to 
other government institutions, such as the antitrust agencies and the federal courts. 
          Karpoff et al. (1999) examine the market and legal penalties imposed on firms 
suspected or accused of procurement fraud between 1983 and 1995. They find that 
on average, firms investigated for procurement fraud suffer statistically significant in 
market value around the announcement dates. The negative reaction is less 
pronounced for firms ranked among the top 100 military suppliers. 
 
4.3 Cost Shifting Hypothesis 
 
          It may be argued that a major reason for the interest in defense profits is the 
so-called cost-shifting hypothesis. Rogerson (1992) claims that the cost allocation 
rules used in government contracting enable and encourage contractors to shift some 
of the costs of their commercial operations to the government. He argues that the 
methods used by defense firms for calculating the cost of products- in particular, the 
allocation of overhead in proportion to directly charged labor use- enable these firms 
to shift overhead from commercial to defense business.  
         Thomas and Tung (1992) argue that government contractors are able to reduce 
their cost of doing nongovernmental business by overfunding pension plans when 
employees work on defense contracts (these contributions are reimbursed by the 
government) and withdrawing excess pension assets when employees work on 
commercial business. They empirically examine the relation between funding levels 
and proportion of revenue from defense contracts for a sample of 80 major 
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Department of Defense contractors between 1971 and 1980. They also compared the 
pension funding empirically between defense and non-defense samples. The study 
suggests that the ability to shift costs from commercial to defense business should 
allow ‘mixed’ firms to be more profitable than purely commercial firms. 
         A recent study about the cost-shifting hypothesis is the one by Mcgowan and 
Vendrzyk (2002). They test the conjecture from prior research that defense 
contractors’ excess profitability stemmed from their ability to shift common 
overhead costs to government contracts that typically allow cost reimbursement or 
price renegotiation. Although they confirm that defense contractors enjoyed 
abnormally high profits on their government work over the 1984-1989 period, they 
find no evidence that these excess profits are attributable to cost shifting. 
          Table 3 displays the summary of studies related to relative profit performance 
of defense firms. Most of the studies used accounting data for the analysis while a 
few of them relied on stock data. These studies cover different time periods from 
1952 to 1989 and most of them find abnormal returns for defense firms.  
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TABLE 3 
 
Summary of Studies Related to Relative Performance of Defense Firms 
 
Author Date of publication Period Examined Findings 
 
Measure 
     
Weidenbaum 1968 1952-1955 High Accounting  
  1962-1965 High Accounting  
LMI 
(Log.Man.Ins.) 
1969 1962-1968 Low Accounting  
Agapos&Gallaway 1970 1942-1967 Normal Accounting  
Stigler&Friedland 1971 1948-1961 High Stock  
  1958-1968 Normal  
Bohi 1973 1960-1969 Normal Accounting 
Greer&Liao 1986 1963-1982 Low Accounting 
Lichtenberg 1992 1984-1989 High Accounting 
Trevino&Higgs 1992 1970-1989 High Accounting& 
Stock 
 
McGowan& 
Vendrzyk 
2002 1984-1989 High Accounting  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
 
          The purpose of this study is to examine the long-run stock market performance 
of US defense stocks over different time periods and analyze the impact of changes 
in Federal Acquisition Policy on defense stock returns. Acquisition policy, which is 
the focus of this study, is just one of the factors that affect defense industry profits. 
Other factors can be the general demand for weapon systems, which may change due 
to political considerations and wars, the level of competition in the defense industry 
or the speed of technological improvements. This type of a study that measures the 
impact of specific events on the value of firms is called  ‘event study’ in the literature. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows: The first two sections describe the 
methodology used in measuring the relative performance of defense stocks and 
conducting the event study. The third section describes the data 
 
5.1 Relative performance analysis 
 
           In chapter 3, the literature on defense firms’ profits was discussed. These 
studies differ in several ways: sample formation, the period of the analysis, and the 
measure of profitability. Not surprisingly, their findings also varied.    
           In this study, relative performance of defense stocks is examined over the 
period from 1945 to 2000. This is a long enough period and includes the periods 
analyzed by other papers in the literature. 
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5.1.1 Classification and Periods examined 
 
          The sample period is examined by focusing on sub periods based on the 
structure in the Defense Acquisition History project1 of the US Department of 
Defense. The aim of this ongoing project is to examine the evolution of defense 
acquisition process over time. It divides US defense acquisition history into five 
major sub-periods. Table 4 depicts these sub-periods, and the events that start them. 
The major characteristics of each sub period can be summarized as follows: 
          Into the cold war, 1945-1958 
          This period starts with the end of World War 2, which can be called the 
beginning of the cold war era. The international role of the US has been very 
important during the first decade of the Cold War.  Acquisition organizations, 
policies, and processes were important to support the country in this respect. In an 
atmosphere of intense rivalry, the Armed Services applied new organizational 
structures and management theories to the development of increasingly complex 
weapon systems, such as the Atlas intercontinental ballistic missile and the Polaris 
submarine-launched ballistic missile.  To a greater extent than ever before in 
peacetime, the Armed Services came to rely on the resources of the private sector to 
fulfill their material requirements as the scope, scale, and complexity of acquisition 
increased.  
Not very much effort was exerted to reform the acquisition system in this period. 
Moreover, there was an increasing political tension with Soviet Union and it led to 
development of complex weapon systems. These features make this period suitable 
for defense firms to earn excess profits.  
                                                 
1 http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/acquisition/ 
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TABLE 4 
 
 
Major Periods In Defense Acquisition History 
 
Name of the Period 
 
Date 
  
Event That Starts the Period 
 
 
Date of the 
Event 
 
Into the Cold War  1945-1958  The end of world war 2 September 2, 1945 
Centralization and 
Systematization 1958-1968  
Enactment of Defense  
Reorganization Act April 3, 1958 
Retrenchment and 
Reform  1968-1980  Election of Nixon as president 
November
5, 1968 
From the Reagan 
Buildup to the end of 
the Cold War 
1980-1989  Election of Reagan as president November 4, 1980 
The Post-Cold War 
Era  1989-2000  
The end of cold war  
(Fall of Berlin Wall) 
November 
9, 1989 
  
 
Source: Defense Acquisition History Project, US Department of Defense 
 
          Centralization and Systematization, 1958-1968  
          This period starts with the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, which gave 
the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) significantly greater control over the 
acquisition process. Several changes in the acquisition process occurred during the 
tenure of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara.  Utilizing his authority, 
McNamara introduced a new program to ensure that weapons procurement supported 
the Kennedy Administration's new national military strategy, which emphasized 
flexible nuclear response and the strengthening of conventional force capabilities. 
Drawing from his business experience in the private sector, McNamara moved to 
control costs by employing cost-effectiveness calculations and new methods of 
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contracting.  By the time he resigned from his post in 1968, McNamara’s strategies 
and methods in the field of acquisition had become the focus of considerable 
criticism within and outside the U.S. Government.  Nonetheless, several of 
McNamara’s reforms have had far-reaching effects. 
          In summary, the new national military strategy for nuclear and conventional 
weapons created new opportunities for the defense industry to increase its sales to the 
government. However, the reform efforts may have negative impacts for the defense 
industry profits. 
          Retrenchment and Reform, 1968-1980  
         The election of Nixon as president is the starting point for this period. The first 
important characteristic of this period is Davis Packard’s efforts.  David Packard, the 
Deputy Secretary of Defense in the Nixon Administration, initiated the overview of 
the reforms upon his assumption of office in 1969. Packard’s efforts focused on 
changes in the acquisition process that were intended to reduce dependence on 
concurrent development. He emphasized competition to improve system 
performance. Moreover, Packard initiated the development of a group of government 
acquisition professionals. Foundation of the Defense Systems Management School is 
an example of this effort.  
          The second important characteristic of this period is the budget reductions of 
the 1970s. Popular opposition to the Vietnam War led to pressure for reduced U.S. 
defense spending, which consequently resulted in a lower state of operational 
readiness for U.S. forces. Moreover, quantitative and qualitative gains by the Soviets 
in military forces (and strategic weapons in particular) threatened the military 
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technological dominance of the United States. This fact forced the US to develop 
high-profile weapon systems like F-15 fighter aircraft. 
          To sum up, the interaction of acquisition reforms with budget reductions of 
1970s characterizes this period. Although it is hard to predict the net effect of these 
on defense profits, it is clear that budget cuts and Packard’s efforts related to 
improving competition should affect defense firms in a negative way, especially in 
an environment where the US is eager for new weapons due to Soviet Union threat. 
          From the Reagan Buildup to the End of the Cold War, 1980-1989 
          This period starts with the election of Reagan as president. There are two main 
features of the period. First, this period saw an increase in defense budget and the 
resulting deficit. Second, it was a period of successful and intense efforts to reform 
the acquisition process. 
          In the first years of the period, defense budgets increased rapidly in response to 
the perception that the US had allowed its armed forces to dwindle, while the Soviet 
Union had continued to boost its armed forces. In order to deal with the budget 
deficits that resulted from increasing spending, while cutting tax revenues, Congress 
passed the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Deficit Reduction Act in October 1985.  
          In terms of the efforts related to defense acquisition reform, there are several 
initiatives in this period. During the 1980s Congressional reformers launched the 
Military Reform Caucus, an informal coalition of House and Senate members. The 
Caucus’ efforts resulted with the 1984 Competition in Contracting Act (CICA), 
which promoted “full and open competition” in all federal procurement procedures. 
Reagan established the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense 
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Management (the Packard Commission) in 1986. The Commission considered not 
only the management of the acquisition process, but also the budget process and 
legislative oversight. Finally, defense acquisition had to address the growing 
importance and impact of technology and technological change. Advanced 
technologies were the object of acquisition in the form of such weapon systems as 
cruise missiles, and stealthy aircraft. Technology also helped to simplify acquisition 
processes through the automation of acquisition management and logistics.  
          In the first five years of the period, it can be expected that defense firms earned 
excess profits. However, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Deficit Reduction Act and 
the several regulatory initiatives have a considerable potential to restrict excess 
profits during the rest of 1980s. 
          The Post-Cold War Era, 1989-1999 
          The end of cold war starts this period. The first feature of this period is the 
uncertainty and difficulty of strategic planning after the end of cold war. The second 
feature is the effort of the Armed Services to transform themselves. The third feature 
is the deficit reduction after the end of Gulf War. Finally, landmark regulation and 
legislation characterized the period. 
          First, the collapse of the Cold War international regime brought much 
uncertainty about the future direction of U.S. military policy and the source of future 
threats.  The Persian Gulf crisis of 1990-91 revealed the difficulty of strategic 
planning in an ever-changing world.  Security threats were increasingly difficult to 
measure or even define; terrorism, humanitarian disasters, and even information 
attack became military problems.  
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          Second, rapid technological change, especially in information technology and 
other high-tech fields resulted in the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).  By the 
end of the 1990s, the Armed Services were all engaged in efforts to transform 
themselves, technologically and organizationally, in accordance with RMA concepts.  
          Third, after the Gulf War a deficit reduction occurred. The Armed Forces 
steadily declined in size, as defense budget was reduced. This limited the funding 
available for research, development and procurement, and it led to consolidation 
within the defense industry.   
          Finally, this period witnessed the passage of landmark legislation and the 
promulgation of new regulations to professionalize the acquisition workforce and 
introduce new acquisition practices and organizations. 1993 National Performance 
Review (NPR), 1994 Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) and 1996 
Clinger-Cohen Act were among these regulations. These reform efforts were driven 
not only for the purpose of efficiency, but also by the extreme scarcity of resources.   
          In summary, the end of cold war, decreasing defense budgets and the landmark 
reforms in the acquisition process are factors that have the potential to reduce 
defense industry profits. However, there may be defense firms, which benefited from 
the potential reduction in competition caused by the consolidation in the industry. 
 
5.1.2 Methodology Used in the Relative Performance Analysis 
 
          The analysis compares the performance of a defense stocks portfolio to that of 
a benchmark portfolio in each of the five sub-periods. Thus, two different portfolios 
were constructed for the analysis. One is the sample firm’s portfolio that contains 
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defense firms; the other is the benchmark portfolio, which is composed of Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) market 
capitalization deciles.  
          The choice of benchmark is more important when long-term rather than short-
term performance is measured. Evidence in Dimson and Marsh (1986) suggests that 
an adjustment for firm size is important in studies of long-run performance. They 
demonstrate that size effect can distort long-term performance measures. They point 
out that performance measures can be seriously distorted (1) when event stocks differ 
in size or weighting from the index constituents, (2) when the size effect is large (3) 
when the measurement interval is long. Fama and French (1992) document that stock 
returns are related to firm size and book-to-market ratios. Barber and Lyon (1997) 
argue matching sample firms to control firms based on these two characteristics 
gives more reliable results since it eliminates new listing, rebalancing and skewness 
biases. Due to data limitations, it was not possible to control for the book-to-market 
ratio characteristic in this study. 
         Defense stocks portfolio: 
         For each period, securities available at the beginning of the period are used to 
form the defense stocks portfolio, which is equally weighted and rebalanced 
monthly. If a security drops out from one month to the next, the equally weighted 
average return is calculated using the remaining securities. Delisting of a security can 
be because of a merger, exchange or liquidation. Delisting information is 
demonstrated by the delisting codes in CRSP, which classify the cause of delisting 
into 57 categories. Table 5 depicts the delisting codes observed for the sample firms 
in this study. 
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TABLE 5 
 
Delisting Codes 
Code Category Explanation 
100 Active Issue still trading NYSE/AMEX or NASDAQ 
231 Mergers When merged, shareholders receive common stock or ADRs. 
233 Mergers When merged, shareholders receive cash payments. 
241 Mergers When merged, shareholders primarily receive common stock and cash 
242 Mergers 
When merged, shareholders receive common stock, preferred stock or 
warrants. 
243 Mergers When merged, shareholders receive common stock  
331 Exchanges Issue exchanged, for another class of common stock. 
500 Dropped Issue stopped trading on exchange-reason available. 
551 Dropped Delisted by current exchange-insufficient number of shareholders. 
552 Dropped Delisted by current exchange-price fell below acceptable level. 
580 Dropped 
Delisted by current exchange-delinquent in filling, non-payment of 
fees. 
582 Dropped 
Delisted by current exchange-failure to meet exception or equity 
requirements. 
585 Dropped 
Delisted by current exchange-protection of investors and the public 
interest 
 
Source: Data Description Guide for the CRSP US Stock Database and CRSP US Indices 
Database. 
 
           Benchmark portfolio: 
          The design of the benchmark portfolio is similar to Agrawal et al. (1992). 
CRSP NYSE market capitalization decile portfolios are used for this purpose. These 
portfolios are rebalanced by CRSP each year, using the security market capitalization 
at the end of the previous year to rank the securities. The largest securities are placed 
in portfolio 10 and the smallest securities are placed in portfolio 1. Using the 
capitalization values of sample firms and the minimum and maximum market values 
for each year for each decile, sample stocks were categorized into ten groups. The 
weight of a decile in the benchmark portfolio reflects the percentage of sample stocks 
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falling into that decile. Benchmark portfolio is rebalanced monthly to account for any 
changes in weights due to delistings of sample stocks. 
            As a result, for each of the five periods, two portfolios were constructed with 
monthly time series of returns. Using the monthly returns, four measures were 
calculated for both portfolios.  These measures are; Rp  (Average return of the 
portfolio), BHR (Buy and hold return of the portfolio), β (Beta) and σ (Standard 
deviation).  
          1. Rp  : Average monthly return of the portfolio over each period, is calculated 
as: 
∑= T ptp RTR 1
1  ,                    ( 1 )     
 where Rpt  is the return of the portfolio in month t and T is the number of months in 
the period. 
          2. BHR:  Buy and hold return of the portfolios, at the end of each period is 
given by: 
∏ +=
=
T
t
ptRBHR
1
)1( ,                ( 2 ) 
where Rpt  is the return of the portfolio in month t, T   is the number of months in the 
period. 
          We can always split the variance of the return on a security or portfolio into 
two parts:  
( ) ( ) ( )εσσβσ 2222 += rr M   .   ( 3 ) 
          The first term on the right hand side of the equation is called the systematic 
risk of the investment. It accounts for that part of the security’s variance, which 
cannot be diversified away. This part of the variance measures the contribution of an 
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asset to the variance of a well-diversified portfolio. The second term is called 
residual variance or unsystematic risk. It represents the part of a security’s total 
variance that disappears as we diversify. 
          3. β  (Beta) of the portfolio: β represents the systematic risk of the portfolio. 
This measure was calculated for each portfolio by regressing portfolio returns on 
CRSP NYSE value-weighted index.  
          4.σ (Standard deviation) of the portfolio: This measure represents the total risk 
of the portfolio. It is calculated as follows: 
σ  = 
( )
T
R pR pt
T
t
∑ −
=1
2
   ,    ( 4 ) 
where R p  is the mean of the monthly portfolio returns over the period, R pt  is the 
return on portfolio in month t and T is the total number of months in the period. 
        In testing the difference between sample and benchmark returns, t-test and 
Wilcoxon ranksum test were employed. These are parametric and non-parametric 
tests, respectively. A parametric test assumes that data come from a specific 
distribution, usually the normal distribution. A non-parametric approach is free of 
such an assumption. The inclusion of a non-parametric test provides a check of the 
robustness of conclusions based on a parametric test. Therefore, both tests were 
employed in the analysis. 
t-test tests the equality of means. The test statistics for µµ yx =  for unknown σ  and 
σσ yx ≠ , is given by: 
( )
n
S y
n
S x
yxt
yx
22
+
−=   ,     ( 5 ) 
where S x  and S y  denote the sample variances of x and y, respectively.  
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Wilcoxon ranksum test is based on ranks and tests the hypothesis that two 
independent samples come from distributions with equal medians. The test statistic 
is: 
                                                     
)(
)(
TVar
TETz −=    ,       ( 6 ) 
where T is the sum of ranks for the observations in the sample. 
 
5.2. The Impact of Regulatory Changes 
 
             This section is organized as follows. First, the event study concept is 
reviewed. Next, the advantages of using the multivariate regression model (MVRM) 
in event studies are described. Finally the version MVRM used in this study is 
discussed. 
 
5.2.1 Event Studies 
 
       An event study measures the impact of a specific event on the value of a firm. 
The usefulness of such a study comes from the fact that, given rationality in the 
market, the effects of an event will be reflected immediately in security prices. 
(Mackinley (1997)) According to Mackinley, by using the event study methodology 
a measure of the event's economic impact can be constructed using security prices 
observed over a relatively short time period. In contrast, direct productivity related 
measures may require many months or even years of observation. The event study 
has many applications. In accounting and finance research, event studies have 
been applied to a variety of firm specific and economy wide events. Some examples 
include mergers and acquisitions, earnings announcements, issues of new debt or eq-
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uity, and announcements of macro-economic variables such as the trade. 
According to Megginson (1997) event studies became an important tool of 
research because of their clarity of purpose, flexibility, and absence of 
confusing influences. 
          There are four types of event studies: 
          1. Market efficiency studies: They assess how quickly and correctly the 
market reacts to a particular type of new information. 
         2. Information usefulness studies: They assess the degree to which company 
returns react to the release of a particular bit of news. 
         3. Metric explanation: In a metric explanation study, the event study is only the 
first step. Early studies explained the metrics (extra returns) by splitting the 
sample into different sub samples and examining whether the unusual element 
of returns differed among the sub samples. More recent studies use excess returns as 
dependent variables in cross-sectional regressions to explain the source of the extra 
returns. 
          4. Methodology studies: These are related to event study design, research that 
considers how best to run event studies. 
         Although there is not a unique method, most of the event studies use the 
following main steps: 
          1. Defining the event date: The event can be a dividend announcement, a 
regulation, or any news that the market may react. Event date is the date when the 
market anticipated the news related to the event. 
          2.Measuring abnormal returns: Abnormal returns are the difference between 
realized returns and the expected returns. There are several approaches in 
characterizing expected returns: 
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          1.Mean returns: In this approach, a company is expected to generate the same 
return that it averaged during the estimation period.  
          2.Market returns: According to this approach, a company, in the absence of 
news, is expected to generate the same returns as the rest of the market during the 
event window. 
          3.Control portfolio returns: A portfolio of companies is selected that resemble 
the sample firms except for the absence of news about the firms in the control 
portfolio. 
          4. Conditional or risk-adjusted returns: In this approach, a regression model is 
used to predict expected returns for the firm.  
          3. Statistically testing the abnormal returns: The last step in the event study is 
statistical testing of aggregated returns. Different researchers have employed 
different tests. 
       There are several problems in using the standard event study methodology. 
These problems are non-normality, autocorrelation in residuals, variance shifts and 
event clustering. The most important one in the context of regulatory event studies 
is the last problem. Event clustering refers to events occurring at or near the same 
time for all sample firms. There can be also industry clustering, which is the case in 
this study, which refers to events concentrated in the same industry. In standard 
event study methodology, both event clustering and industry clustering lead to 
correlation between residuals and consequently give rise to Type 1 error. To deal 
with this problem, a version of MVRM is used in this study.  
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5.2.2 Multivariate Regression Model in Event Studies 
 
          In standard event studies, an estimation period is used to estimate the 
expected returns. An alternative strategy can be to extend the estimation period to 
contain the event period. In the case of a single event, a zero-one variable Dt  can be 
included in the return equation: 
uDRR ittimtiiit +++= γβα  ,        ( 7 ) 
where Ri  is the return on the security of firm i in period t, Rmt  is the return on the 
market portfolio in that period, Dt  is a dummy variable that equals one during the 
event period and 0 otherwise, uit  is a random component, and α i , β i  and γ i are the 
parameters. The coefficient γ i  characterizes the abnormal return for security i 
during period t and directly estimated in the regression.  
          For N securities, this method results in a system of N equations: 
uDRR ttmtt 11111 +++= γβα  
  uDRR ttmtt 22222 +++= γβα  
                                                  .                                       ( 8 ) 
. 
. 
       uDRR NttNmtNNNt +++= γβα  . 
          Here, individual excess returns are allowed to differ across firms. This system 
of equations is an application of the general seemingly unrelated regression model. 
Its use in event studies is first proposed in Gibbons (1980). The system can be 
expressed as a single regression in the following form: 
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where Ri  is a T X 1 vector, 
X i  is a T X K matrix of independent variables, which is the same for each equation 
in the system. 
δ i  is a K x 1 vector of coefficients, for the system in ( 8 ) it contains α i  , β i  and 
γ i , 
ε i   is a T X 1 vector of disturbances. 
The system can be written simply,  
                                εδ +Χ=R  .         ( 10 ) 
          There are three assumptions made by multivariate regression model. First, 
disturbances are independent and identically distributed within each equation. 
Second, disturbance variance is allowed to differ across firms. Third, 
noncontemporaneous covariances of the disturbances across securities are assumed 
to be zero. These assumptions fit stock return data well. Therefore, the covariance 
matrix of disturbances can be expressed as: 
                        IV ⊗Σ=    and         ( 11 ) 
                                                       IV ⊗Σ= −− 11  ,         ( 12 ) 
where  Σ is the N X N covariance matrix of contemporaneous disturbances, 
I is a T X K identity matrix, 
⊗ is the Kronecker product. 
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          The equation (10) is estimated with generalized least squares. GLS estimator 
is: 
           [ ] RVXXVX i111 −− ′−′=δ  .    ( 13 ) 
            Σ  is not known, therefore V is not known, either. In order to make GLS 
estimation feasible one can use ∑ˆ  instead of the true ∑ . The ordinary least squares 
residuals are used to estimate consistently the elements of ∑ with:  
                     
T
ee
S jiijij
ˆ
ˆ ==σ   .           ( 14 ) 
         Although GLS is different from ordinary least squares, if the equations have 
identical explanatory variables, as in our case, it can be shown that coefficient 
estimates from OLS and GLS are identical. (Greene 1990). If the equations are 
actually unrelated and disturbances are uncorrelated, there is no efficiency gain from 
using MVRM. However, the real advantage of the approach is in hypothesis testing 
since heteroscedasticity across equations and contemporaneous dependence of the 
disturbances are explicitly incorporated into the hypothesis tests. This avoids the 
statistical problems in the standard event study methodology. In MVRM, joint 
hypothesis about the abnormal returns can be easily tested. (Binder 1985). Table 6 
depicts the hypotheses of this study, which are also of primary interest in this 
literature: 
 
TABLE 6 
 
Hypothesis 
               Hypotheses                                                      Description 
H1: 01 =∑ γ iaiN  The average abnormal return during announcement period a equals zero. 
H2:  iia ∀= 0γ  All abnormal returns for announcement period a equals zero. 
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          Test of H1 is similar to that in the standard event study. Test of H2 is a joint 
hypothesis that the abnormal returns are zero for all firms. It is a more powerful test 
than tests of H1 when the abnormal returns differ in sign. Wald test can be applied in 
testing those two hypotheses. This test is asymptotically distributed as chi-squared 
due to the use of a consistent estimate of the covariance matrix. The Wald statistic is  
W = )ˆ()ˆ()ˆ(
1 qRRVRqR −′′− − δδ ,      ( 15 ) 
where δˆ  is the estimated coefficient vector, 
Vˆ  is the estimated variance –covariance matrix, 
qR −δˆ  denote the set of linear restrictions to be tested jointly. 
 
5.2.3 Methodology of the analysis examining the impact of regulatory changes 
 
         The preceding discussion of using MVRM in event studies considered the 
analysis of a single event. The number of dummy variables can be increased if there 
are multiple events or multiple announcements. Schipper and Thompson (1983) and 
Binder (1985) use MVRM in their studies to examine the effects of regulation. Both 
models measure excess returns during the periods of multiple announcements related 
to regulatory changes. 
         Schipper and Thompson (1983) use the following model: 
( uDRRRR it
A
a
atifmtiifit +∑+−+=− γβα )()  ,      (16 ) 
with additional parameters; where 
R f  is the risk free rate. 
γ i  is the coefficient of the impact of the regulatory change for firm i, that reflects the 
uniform treatment of all announcements. 
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Dat  is a dummy variable that equals one during the ath announcement period and 
zero otherwise.  
A is the total number of announcements for the regulatory change. 
          Binder (1985) uses the following model: 
            u
A
a
DatiaDRRDJANDR ittmtititititotitiit +∑=
+++++=
1
0 γββααα   ,     ( 17) 
with additional parameters; where 
D t0  is a dummy variable that equals one for every observation between the first 
announcement period and the last observation in the sample inclusive, and zero for 
every other observation. This dummy variable allows alpha and beta to change when 
the market’s expectation of regulatory constraint changes,  
DJANt  is a dummy variable that equals one only during January and controls for the 
January seasonality in the size effect in stock returns, 
γ ia  is the coefficient of the regulatory change for firm i in announcement month a, 
Dat  is a dummy variable that equals one during the ath announcement period and 
zero otherwise. 
          There are four main differences between the methodologies of these two 
studies. The first one is the usage of risk free rate for calculating excess returns in 
Schipper and Thompson (1983). The second and third differences are concerned with 
the process of controlling for the January seasonality and allowing alpha and beta to 
change in Binder (1985). Final and the main difference is related to consideration of 
the regulatory event variables. Schipper and Thompson (1983) apply a uniform 
treatment of announcements. For each regulatory change, they use one dummy 
variable for all announcement periods, which takes the value of one during the 
announcement periods and zero otherwise. Binder (1985) applies a differential 
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treatment of announcements. He uses different dummy variables for each 
announcement and measures the effect of each announcement separately. In this 
study, Binder’s model is used to measure the effects of regulation. The estimation 
periods are determined as follows. First, the date, which lies in the middle of the first 
and the last announcement dates, is identified. 30 months before and after this date 
forms the 60-month estimation period for the analysis of each regulatory change. 
Table 7 displays the sample of regulatory reform initiatives that are examined. In the 
table it is possible to see the first announcement date, the last announcement date, the 
number of announcements and the number of months from the first announcement 
month to the last announcement month. There are two types of regulatory initiatives; 
commissions and acts. For commissions, the first and last announcement dates 
denote the dates when commissions are established and the reports are delivered, 
respectively. For acts, these dates refer to dates when the acts are introduced and 
approved, in the senate or the house, respectively.   
       Requirements of these regulations are displayed in Table 8. According to 
Binder (1985), it is not clear apriori that the effects of the regulation are consistently 
positive or negative: in the same industry some firms may gain while others lose. 
This is one of the features of the regulatory event studies that make them more 
difficult than the standard event study. The same holds for the regulations in 
acquisition process. However, some predictions can be made by examining the 
motives and requirements of the regulations. There are several common 
characteristics of these reforms like reducing the inefficiencies and improving the 
acquisition system. What actually differentiates them is the acquisition atmosphere 
in which the regulations are put into action. It is better categorizing them in different 
periods as was suggested in the defense acquisition history project.  
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          Hoover Commission (1949) is one of the first important reform initiatives in 
defense acquisition history. It emphasized centralization and simplification of the 
procurement system. The commission was motivated by the complexity and 
confusion surrounding the procurement. For instance in 1947, there were seven 
supply systems in the Army, and 18 systems in the Navy. Hoover Commission 
recommended that the authority of the Secretary of Defense be strengthened so that 
he could integrate the organization and procedures of the various phases of supply in 
the military services. Such a regulation is expected to bring negative impacts for 
defense firms since it may eliminate the opportunistic behavior in a complex 
environment where acquisition process is difficult to be managed. The effect can be 
worse especially in a period when the country is eager for new weapons and not very 
much reform effort exists.   
          TINA (1962) required contractors to provide full and fair disclosure in the 
conduct of negotiations. The act was motivated by the perceived contractor waste, 
fraud and abuse. It falls into the second period. This period is characterized by the 
new national military strategy for nuclear and conventional weapons and Secretary 
of Defense Robert S. McNamara’s efforts to make the acquisition system more 
systematic. The act is expected to affect the defense firms negatively due to its 
restrictive character.  
          Commission in Government Procurement (1972) recommended a shift toward 
commercial product acquisition, increase competition and eliminate inconsistencies 
and confusion in procurement system. The commission was motivated by the desire 
to increase competition in the system and it falls into the third period. It is noticeable 
that it is one of the first reform initiatives that emphasize competition and reliance on 
commercial items. Commercial items refer to commercial products and technologies 
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developed in purely competitive market by the commercial companies or the 
commercial divisions of defense companies. Where feasible, it leads to relying on the 
relatively similar technologies and products in the commercial market, except the 
military unique high-tech weapon systems. In this period, despite the budget cuts in 
1970s, the US is still ambitious for new high-tech weapon systems due to Soviet 
threat. The impact of the commission is expected to be negative.  
          The rest of the regulations fall into the last two periods. As can be 
remembered, the fourth period (1980-1989) is marked with an increase in defense 
budget in the first five years. However, there is an intense effort to reform the 
acquisition system especially after 1984. The Competition in Contracting Act of 
1984 and Blue Ribbon Commission of 1986 are examples. Reform effort has been 
accelerated after the end of cold war. Consequently, the fifth period witnessed 
landmark legislations like Advisory Panel, FASA, NPR and Clinger-Cohen Act. 
Increasing the competition, improving and streamlining the internal structure of the 
acquisition process are the common characteristics of these reforms. The last period 
is characterized by the budget cuts, consolidation and the reduction in workforce in 
defense industry. The impacts of the regulations in the last two periods are expected 
to be negative. 
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TABLE 7 
    
The sample of Regulatory reform Initiatives 
     
Regulatory Change First Announcement  Last Announcement   a t 
     
May 5, 1949 3 22 Hoover Commission on 
Organization 
of the Executive Branch of the 
Government 
    July 7, 1947 
   
     
Truth-In-Negotiations Act 
(TINA)  
September 10, 1962 2 4 
 
   April 30, 1962 
   
Commission on Government  
Procurement 
December 31, 1972 2 37 
 
   November 26, 1969 
   
     
The Competition in Contracting 
Act  
April 1, 1985 2 8 
    
 
   July 18, 1984 
   
   July 15, 1985 June 30, 1986 3 11 
    
The President's Blue Ribbon  
Commission on Defense 
Management 
(The "Packard Commission") 
    
     
     
   November 5, 1990 January 12, 1993 2 25 
    
    
Advisory Panel on Streamlining 
and  
Codifying Acquisition Laws 
pursuant 
to Section 800 of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for  
Fiscal Year 1991 
    
     
National Performance Review 
(NPR)  
   March 3, 1993 September 7, 1993 2 6 
     
     
Federal Acquisition 
Streamlining Act (FASA) 
   October 26, 1993 October 13, 1994 4 10 
     
Clinger-Cohen Act     February 10, 1996 November 18, 1997 3 15 
     
Note: a is the number of announcements about each regulatory change and t is the number of 
months from the first announcement month to the last announcement month, inclusive. 
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TABLE 8 
 
Major Regulatory Initiatives in Federal Acquisition 
 
Regulatory Initiative Requirement 
 
1949 Hoover Commission on 
Organization of the Executive  
Branch of the Government 
 
 
Recommended the centralization and simplification of 
the defense procurement process by giving more 
authority to the secretary of defense. 
 
 
1962 Truth-In-Negotiations 
 Act (TINA) 
Required contractors to support their prices with cost 
and 
pricing data and to provide for full and fair disclosure 
in the conduct of negotiations. 
 
 
 
1972 Commission on Government 
Procurement 
 
Recommended a shift toward commercial product 
acquisition, increase competition and eliminate 
inconsistencies and confusion in procurement system. 
 
 
 
1984 The Competition in  
Contracting Act 
 
 
Established the competitive acquisition systems and 
recommended a procurement system through full and 
open competitive procedures. 
 
 
 
1986 The President's Blue  
Ribbon Commission on Defense 
Management (the "Packard 
Commission") 
 
 
Recommended reducing DOD’s reliance on military 
specifications, streamlining the defense acquisition 
process.  
 
 
 
 
1993 Advisory Panel on  
Streamlining and Codifying  
Acquisition Laws pursuant to  
Section 800 of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 1991 
Report called for improving government access to 
commercial technologies and streamlining and 
improving acquisition system by extending the 
definition of commercial items to also include the 
services. 
 
 
 
1993 National Performance  
Review (NPR) 
 
Recommended increased reliance on the acquisition of 
commercial items, cutting red tape, and increasing the 
efficiency of acquisition system. 
 
 
1994 Federal Acquisition  
Streamlining Act (FASA) 
 
Streamlined acquisition procedures for commercial 
items while initiating a computer-based system and 
placing a greater emphasis upon the use of past 
performance when selecting a contractor. 
 
 
1996 Clinger-Cohen Act 
 
Built upon FASA initiatives, simplified the acquisition 
of commercial items, and allowed contracting officers 
to select competitive contractors more efficiently.  
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5.3 Data and the Sample 
 
          The data used in this study are obtained mainly from CRSP. Monthly stock 
return data with dividend adjustment, value weighted index returns, NYSE 
capitalization decile portfolio returns and capitalization values are taken from CRSP.  
          Another issue related to data is the identification of the event dates. Unlike 
stock splits or similar simple events, regulatory events usually involve no single 
well-defined announcement; rather there are multiple announcements, such as 
formation of a committee, announcement of a committee report, and House or Senate 
approval during the legislative process. A source like Wall Street Journal index or 
New York Times index is generally used for this purpose. Due to lack of these 
sources, announcement dates of each regulation were obtained from the Internet and 
via e-mail from several librarians in the US.  
           Examining the effects of regulatory changes requires identifying securities 
likely to be affected by these changes. The following procedure was applied to form 
the sample used in this study: First, the universe of standard industrial classification 
codes (SIC) was examined and nine exclusively military ones were determined. 
These SIC codes gave a sample of 48 firms. Second, datastream aerospace-defense 
list and Department of Defense Top 100 Contractors lists from 1995 to 2000 were 
examined. It appeared that the sample obtained by using those nine SIC codes did not 
contain several major defense firms. To account for this gap, three additional SIC 
codes were identified by relying on those two lists. These SIC codes are 3721, 3724 
and 3731, representing the manufacturers of aircraft, aircraft engine and 
shipbuilding, respectively. Finally, firms with these SIC codes were screened to 
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eliminate those which operate in non-defense industries. The process gave 19 
additional firms. The overall procedure resulted in a total of 67 firms. Table 9 shows 
the composition of the sample based on SIC codes. Table 10 gives the list of 
securities used in this study. The first column represents the time period in which a 
security remains active. In case of a merger or acquisition, the name of a company 
may change. The second column gives the latest company name. The third column 
shows the primary permanent CRSP identifier (Permno). The last two columns 
present the SIC and delisting codes. 
          Table 11 displays the distribution of sample firms across deciles. The 
percentage of sample firms that fall into different deciles can be observed over 
different periods. Average decile of sample firms is around seven during the first two 
periods. Thus, for those early periods, the sample contains relatively big firms. In the 
last three periods the average decile is slightly smaller than six and implies a 
portfolio typically containing medium size stocks. 
          Table 12 shows the market values for CRSP decile portfolios over different 
years. The numbers show the maximum market values in the corresponding decile 
portfolios. It can be seen that market values have increased over time.  
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 TABLE 9  
   
  
Sic Codes 
   
Sic Code 
 
Explanation 
 
Number 
of firms  
3761  Ballistic missiles, guided missiles, rockets, space and military 4 
3769  Guided missile and space vehicles and auxiliary equipment 4 
3764  Engines and engine parts, propulsion units, rocket motors, guided missile 5 
3484  Small arms 5 
3489  Ordnance and accessories (naval, aircraft, tank, coast, field artillery) 2 
3795  Tanks and tank components 2 
3812  Search, detection, navigation, guidance, aeronautical 20 
3483  Ammunition, except for small arms 4 
3482  Small arms ammunition 2 
3721  Aircraft 7 
3724  Aircraft engines 4 
3731  Shipbuilding 8 
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TABLE 10 
 
Sample Securities List 
 
          
No Period Company Name Permno 
 
 SIC DEL 
1 19370430-19950331 MARTIN MARIETTA CORP NEW 20562 3761 231 
2 19391230-20021231 LOCKHEED MARTIN CORP 21178 3761 100 
3 19880930-19971031 ASTROTECH INTERNATIONAL 75368 3761 231 
4 19900430-20021231 ORBITAL SCIENCES CORP 76139 3761 100 
5 19251231-20021231 GOODRICH CORP 12140 3769 100 
6 19721229-19730731 CONSOLIDATED AIRBORNE SY 26519 3769 500 
7 19620731-19721130 AEROJET GENERAL CORP 28732 3769 231 
8 19721229-19760831 ROSEMOUNT INC 67601 3769 231 
9 19790629-19880129 ATLANTIC RESEARCH CORP 15676 3764 233 
10 19300131-19850228 AVCO CORP 18606 3764 233 
11 19400531-20000531 CORDANT TECHNOLOGIES INC 21290 3764 233 
12 19581231-19820930 THIOKOL CORP 26665 3764 231 
13 19721229-19850628 ROCKCOR INC 67361 3764 233 
14 19721229-19780731 BROWNING 19554 3484 233 
15 19620731-19800131 REMINGTON ARMS INC 35844 3484 231 
16 19710930-19780131 GENERAL RECREATION INC 53292 3484 552 
17 19721229-20021231 STURM RUGER & CO INC 73219 3484 100 
18 19920228-20000131 COLEMAN CO 77368 3484 242 
19 19721229-19740731 GRIFFITHS ELECTRONICS IN 40126 3489 500 
20 19711231-20000531 O E A INC 53639 3489 233 
21 19830831-19870630 WEDTECH CORP 67109 3795 585 
22 19840928-19890331 I M T INC 88816 3795 580 
23 19860131-20010531 SCOTT TECHNOLOGIES INC 10016 3812 231 
24 19721229-20021231 AEROSONIC CORP 11157 3812 100 
25 19721229-20021231 ANALOGIC CORP 14198 3812 100 
26 19290328-20021231 SPARTON CORP 17523 3812 100 
27 19520930-20021231 RAYTHEON CO 24942 3812 100 
28 19570731-20010531 LITTON INDUSTRIES INC 26294 3812 233 
29 19620731-20010430 B A E SYSTEMS CANADA INC 30250 3812 233 
30 19770630-20021231 HERLEY INDUSTRIES INC 41663 3812 100 
31 19681231-20021231 LA BARGE INC 47255 3812 100 
32 19810130-20021231 D R S TECHNOLOGIES INC 65226 3812 100 
33 19721229-20011130 SENSORMATIC ELECTRONICS 70018 3812 551 
34 19901031-20021231 E S C O TECHNOLOGIES INC 76478 3812 100 
35 19930831-19990430 CYCOMM INTERNATIONAL INC 79551 3812 582 
36 19931130-20021231 ELECSYS CORP 79797 3812 100 
37 19940331-20021231 HI SHEAR TECHNOLOGY CORP 80393 3812 100 
38 19961129-20021231 ELBIT SYSTEMS LTD 84207 3812 100 
39 19971231-20010531 RAYTHEON CO 85658 3812 331 
40 19981030-20021231 B V R SYSTEMS LTD 86383 3812 100 
41 20000831-20021231 INNOVATIVE SOLUTIONS & S 88534 3812 100 
42 20001229-20021231 GARMIN LTD 88837 3812 100 
43 19840430-20021231 ALLIED RESEARCH CORP 11923 3483 100 
44 19291031-19991231 HONEYWELL INC 18374 3483 231 
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45 19721229-20021231 TRANSTECHNOLOGY CORP 61209 3483 100 
46 19831230-19881130 SOONER DEFENSE FLA INC 71205 3483 580 
47 19760130-19771130 LEISURE GROUP INC 49155 3482 500 
48 19980930-20021231 D H B INDUSTRIES INC 86355 3482 100 
49 19260130-20021231 GENERAL DYNAMICS CORP 12052 3731 100 
50 19340929-20021231 BOEING CO 19561 3721 100 
51 19471231-20021231 TEXTRON INC 23579 3721 100 
52 19511231-20021231 NORTHROP GRUMMAN CORP 24766 3721 100 
53 19590331-19970731 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS CORP 26729 3721 231 
54 19290531-20021231 UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORP 17830 3721 100 
55 19520930-19890831 FAIRCHILD INDUSTRIES INC 24897 3721 233 
56 19620731-19870130 BUTLER INTERNATIONAL INC 30031 3721 241 
57 19721229-20021231 KAMAN CORP 47002 3721 100 
58 19251231-20021231 HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL 10145 3724 100 
59 19290830-20021231 CURTISS WRIGHT CORP 18091 3724 100 
60 19620731-20021231 HEICO CORP  32678 3724 100 
61 19980430-20021231 HEICO CORP NEW 85945 3724 100 
62 19620731-19710226 ROLLS ROYCE LTD 36011 3724 584 
63 19870130-20021231 SEQUA CORP 72733 3724 100 
64 19870130-20021231 SEQUA CORP NEW 72741 3724 100 
65 19401130-19680930 NEWPORT NEWS SHIPBUILDING 21418 3731 242 
66 19961231-20020131 NEWPORT NEWS SHIPBUILDING NEW 84383 3731 243 
67 19620731-20021231 TODD SHIPYARDS CORP 37399 3731 100 
 
Note: Period refers to the beginning and ending dates of the period in which the security is traded. 
Company name is the latest name of the company after a merger or acquisition. Permno is one of the 
primary permanent identifiers used in CRSP. SIC is the standard industrial classification and DEL is 
the delisting information for the related stocks 
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TABLE 11 
 
Distribution of Sample Firms across Deciles 
 
 1945-1958 1958-1968 1968-1980 1980-1989 1989-1999 
Decile 1 3% 6% 12% 14% 25% 
Decile 2 4% 1% 6% 11% 4% 
Decile 3 2% 2% 5% 9% 4% 
Decile 4 9% 2% 3% 5% 13% 
Decile 5 9% 5% 9% 9% 9% 
Decile 6 12% 9% 6% 4% 6% 
Decile 7 12% 13% 7% 9% 2% 
Decile 8 14% 18% 17% 6% 5% 
Decile 9 19% 21% 16% 14% 10% 
Decile 10 16% 23% 12% 20% 21% 
Average Decile 6.97 7.55 5.81 5.89 5.32 
Number of firms 13 17 25 34 33 
 
 
TABLE 12 
Market Values for Decile Portfolios 
 1945 1958 1968 1980 1989 1998 
Decile 1 553.4 1,009.7 4,442.1 3,282.6 4,881.2 7,880.4 
Decile 2 901.9 1,814.4 6,889.1 5,996.8 8,739.3 14,241.8 
Decile 3 1,191.4 2,754.1 9,278.5 9,393.0 13,800.0 22,899.7 
Decile 4 1,644.3 3,926.5 12,400.1 14,940.6 20,823.7 36,499.6 
Decile 5 2,169.0 5,733.0 16,748.5 21,722.3 34,117.2 53,198.8 
Decile 6 2,943.8 8,810.6 23,655.9 33,246.5 54,681.0 82,545.9 
Decile 7 4,339.5 13,096.0 35,075.0 50,549.4 94,666.2 138,479.4 
Decile 8 6,634.3 24,442.6 56,073.9 85,960.4 179,127.2 262,570.1 
Decile 9 15,024.2 51,593.7 98,341.6 159,223.5 373,581.8 690,373.2 
Decile 10 385,170.6 1,587,262.5 3,558,492.0 3,962,590.0 6,258,160.0 3,423,717.0 
   Note: Numbers are in (x1000) dollars. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
RESULTS 
 
          This chapter discusses the results of the empirical analysis in this study. 
Discussion of the results consists of two parts. First, the results of the relative 
performance analysis are presented. Next, the results of the analysis examining the 
impact of regulations are explained. 
 
6.1 Results of the Relative Performance Analysis 
 
          The classification of the entire 1945-1999 period for the empirical analysis is 
based on the Defense Acquisition History Project of US Department of Defense, 
which divides Defense Acquisition History into five periods. Before a discussion of 
the results, it is useful to take a look at the average difference of the sample portfolio 
and the benchmark portfolio over different periods. This process gives a feeling 
about the data. Figure 1 displays the average monthly excess returns per year.         
           In Figure 1, it can be observed that average monthly excess returns varied 
across periods. For the first period average excess returns are generally positive. As 
was suggested in defense acquisition history project, not very much effort was 
exerted to reform the acquisition system in this period. Moreover, there was an 
increasing political tension with Soviet Union and development of complex weapon 
systems in an atmosphere of intense rivalry. Thus, these features made this period 
suitable for defense firms to earn excess profits. The result is consistent with the 
expectations in this respect.  
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FIGURE 1 
Average Monthly Excess Returns per Year 
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          The second period is marked with the new national military strategy for 
nuclear and conventional weapons in addition to the Secretary of Defense 
Mcnamara’s reforms. These factors seemed to effect defense firms differently over 
the years. At the beginning of the period, there are both positive and negative excess 
returns. Especially after 1964, positive excess returns are observed.  
          At the beginning of the third period, there are negative excess returns. This 
may be explained by the budget cuts and the reform efforts of David Packard, the 
Deputy Secretary of Defense. Consistently positive excess returns are observed in the 
following years. The reason for these excess profits can be desire for developing 
high-profile weapon systems like F-15 fighter aircraft and the Vietnam War.  
          At the beginning of the fourth period, defense budgets increased rapidly in 
response to the perception that the US had allowed its armed forces to dwindle, while 
the Soviet Union had continued to boost its armed forces. In general, this factor 
affected the defense stock returns positively. However, especially after 1984, it can 
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be seen that there are negative excess returns. This can be explained by the very 
successful and intense reform efforts and the deficit reduction act in 1985-1989 
period. Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) and Blue Ribbon Commission on 
Defense Management (the Packard Commission) are examples of the reform efforts. 
          The end of cold war, decreasing defense budgets and the landmark reforms in 
the acquisition process characterizes the last period. Both positive and negative 
excess returns are observed. It is likely that the decreasing competition level in the 
defense industry due to the consolidation is the reason for excess returns. However, 
these positive excess returns seems to have been balanced partly by the reforms like 
National Performance Review (NPR), Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) 
and Clinger-Cohen Act. 
           Table 13 gives the risk and return measures of the two portfolios over these 
periods. It can be seen that, in four periods out of five, sample stocks portfolio 
exceeded the benchmark portfolio in terms of mean and buy and hold returns. 
Benchmark portfolio exceeds the sample portfolio only in 1980-1989 periods. As 
mentioned in the preceding discussion, this period is characterized by the increasing 
defense budget in the beginning and important reforms in the acquisition process 
afterwards. It seems that these reforms affected sample stocks negatively. The 
biggest difference between the sample portfolio and the benchmark portfolio in terms 
of buy and hold returns is in the 1945-1958 period. This is consistent with the 
expectations regarding the period. Increasing political tension with Soviet Union and 
development of complex weapon systems in addition to the lack of reform efforts 
made this period convenient for defense firms to extract excess profits. Sample 
portfolio is slightly riskier than the benchmark portfolio over the periods, except 
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systematic risk in the last period. Both total risk (standard deviation) and systematic 
risk (beta) measures confirm this fact. 
TABLE 13 
 
 
Risk and return measures for the portfolios (1945-1999) 
 
                                                       Sample portfolio                       Benchmark portfolio 
Period BHR Beta Stdev Mean      BHR     Beta      Stdev Mean 
Sep 45- Apr 58 9.4511 1.0911 0.0547 0.0164 4.8023 1.0718 0.0407 0.0112 
Apr 58-Nov 68 5.7745 1.1683 0.0545 0.0153 4.6046 1.0491 0.0357 0.0127 
Nov 68-Nov 80  3.6280 1.3032 0.0762 0.0118 2.6880 1.1834 0.0606 0.0086 
Nov 80-Nov 89  3.0704 1.1404 0.0617 0.0123 3.7861 0.9940 0.0491 0.0136 
Nov 89-Nov 99  5.5841 0.8390 0.0459 0.0152 3.6028 0.9085 0.0374 0.0112 
 
          Table 14 presents the statistical test results for the comparison of the returns of 
two portfolios. The hypotheses that the mean and median of two portfolios are the 
same cannot be rejected for any period.           
 
TABLE 14 
Statistical Test Results for the comparison of the Sample Portfolio and the 
Benchmark Portfolio (1945-1999) 
                                                              t-test                                 Ranksum Test 
  t-statistic p value z-statistic p value 
Sep 1945- Apr 1958 0.9319 0.3522 0.6370 0.5240 
Apr 1958-Nov 1968 0.4540 0.6503 0.5010 0.6161 
Nov 1968-Nov 1980  0.3858 0.700 0.0170 0.9865 
Nov 1980-Nov 1989  -0.1660 0.8683 -0.4790 0.6319 
Nov 1989-Nov 1999  0.7418 0.4590 0.6390 0.5231 
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          The results do not change qualitatively when value weighted market index is 
used instead of the size benchmark portfolio.  Table 15 gives t-test and Wilcoxon 
Ranksum test results for the comparison of the sample portfolio and the market 
index. Statistical test results are still insignificant. 
 
TABLE 15 
 
 
Statistical Test Results for the comparison of Sample Portfolio and 
Market Index (1945-1999) 
                    t-test                Ranksum Test 
  t-statistic p value z-statistic p value 
Sep 1945- Apr 1958 -0.9738 0.3311 0.7280 0.4665 
Apr 1958-Nov 1968 0.8095 0.4192 0.7970 0.4255 
Nov 1968-Nov 1980  -0.7531 0.4521 0.0760 0.9391 
Nov 1980-Nov 1989  0.1407 0.8883 -0.2790 0.7805 
Nov 1989-Nov 1999  -0.4227 0.6729 0.3070 0.7592 
 
          These findings are not consistent with the findings in two comparable papers 
in the literature. These are Stigler and Friedland (1971) and Trevino and Higgs 
(1992). The former study found excess returns over the period 1948-1961. The latter 
one concluded that stock returns of defense contractors exceeded those of 
comparable non-defense companies over the period 1970-1989. 
          One reason for the difference can be the period examined. The two portfolios 
were compared over the periods used in those two studies. Table 16 reports the risk 
and return measures over the periods 1948-1961 and 1970-1989. As in the previous 
tables, although risk and return measures are larger for the sample stocks portfolio 
than the benchmark portfolio, the difference in average returns is not significant as 
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shown in Table 17. Using value-weighted market index in place of the size 
benchmark portfolio (not rejected) leads to the same conclusion. 
 
TABLE 16 
 
 
Risk and Return Measures for the Two Portfolios (1948-1961, 1970-1989) 
 
                                  Sample portfolio 
 
Benchmark portfolio 
 
Period Beta Stdev Mean Beta Stdev Mean 
1948-1961 1.0992 0.0516 0.0193 1.0195 0.0355 0.0136 
1970-1989 1.2527 0.0724 0.0144 1.0979 0.0562 0.0119 
 
 
TABLE 17 
 
 
Statistical Test Results for the Comparison of Sample Portfolio and 
Benchmark Portfolio (1948-1961, 1979-1989) 
 t-test Ranksum Test 
  t-statistic p value z-statistic p value 
1948-1961 1.1810 0.2386 1.1520 0.2493 
1970-1989 0.4215 0.6736 0.0450 0.9639 
 
 
          Another reason for the difference in the findings between this study and those 
two papers can be the benchmark selection. For instance, Stigler and Friedland 
(1971) used NYSE equally weighted index and Trevino and Higgs (1992) used S&P 
500 index as benchmark. On the other hand, a portfolio based on capitalization 
deciles and NYSE value-weighted index are used in this study to control for size. 
Due to size effect, the use of an equally weighted index, as in Stigler and Friedland 
(1971), rather than a size based portfolio is less likely to find positive excess returns. 
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The benchmark used in Trevino and Higgs (1992) is similar to the one in this study. 
Therefore, it is unlikely that the difference is because of the benchmark selection.  
          It may be argued that another reason for the difference is the sample selection. 
Both Stigler and Friedland (1971) and Trevino and Higgs (1992) use top defense 
contractors in their analysis. Top defense contractors are generally big firms in size. 
Employing the same procedure for firms, which have big market values, may lead to 
similar findings. For this purpose, the firms that consistently fall into the largest three 
deciles (deciles 8, 9, and 10) during these periods were identified. Two new 
portfolios of big firms were constructed. 1945-1958 portfolio consists of four firms, 
whereas 1970-1989 portfolio is composed of 10 firms.  
TABLE 18 
 
 
Statistical Test Results for the Comparison of Big Firms’ Portfolio and 
Benchmark Portfolio (1948-1961, 1970-1989) 
 t-test Ranksum Test 
  t-statistic p value z-statistic p value 
1948-1961 0.6834 0.4949 -0.822 0.4110 
1970-1989 1.0317 0.3028 0.600 0.5486 
 
 
 
TABLE 19 
 
 
Statistical Test Results for the Comparison of Big firms’ Portfolio and 
Market index (1948-1961, 1970-1989) 
 t-test Ranksum Test 
  t-statistic p value z-statistic p value 
1948-1961 0.7718 0.4409 -0.887 0.752 
1970-1989 1.0576 0.2909 0.541 0.5884 
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         Table 18 and Table 19 report the test statistics for the comparison of big firms’ 
portfolio to the benchmark portfolio and the market index. Both tables indicate that 
no significant excess return exists over these periods for big firms portfolio, either. 
The preceding analysis suggests the major reason that the findings in this study do 
not support those in other two studies may be the difference in methodologies.  
         These findings do not mean that there are no significant excess returns over the 
years. An analysis of sub periods 1952-1956 and 1976-1980 gives significant excess 
returns for the big firms’ portfolio. Table 20 gives the risk and return measures over 
these periods. Table 21 and Table 22 present the test statistics for the comparison of 
big firms’ portfolio to the benchmark portfolio and market index, respectively. 
 
TABLE 20 
Risk and Return Measures for the Big Firms’ portfolio and the Benchmark 
  
Portfolio (1952-1956, 1976-1980) 
         
                         Sample portfolio Benchmark portfolio 
Period Beta Stdev Mean Beta Stdev Mean 
1952-1956 0.9686 0.0467 0.0287 1.0100 0.0335 0.0149 
1976-1980 0.8613 0.0651 0.0381 0.9860 0.0422 0.0131 
 
 
TABLE 21 
 
Statistical Test Results for the Comparison of Big Firms’ Portfolio and the 
Benchmark Portfolio (1952-1956, 1976-1980) 
 t-test Ranksum Test 
  t-statistic p value z-statistic p value 
1952-1956 1.8601 0.0656 1.973 0.0484 
1976-1980 2.4533 0.0159 2.137 0.0326 
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TABLE 22 
 
 
Statistical Test Results for the Comparison of Big Firms’ Portfolio and 
Market Index (1952-1956, 1976-1980) 
 t-test Ranksum Test 
  t-statistic p value z-statistic p value 
1952-1956 1.9068 0.0592 2.047 0.0407 
1976-1980 2.5152 0.0135 2.192 0.0284 
 
          t-test results are significant at 5 % level for 1976-1980 period. Wilcoxon 
Ranksum test statistics are significant at 5 % level in both periods. 
          To sum up, stock market performance of defense stocks exceeded its 
comparable benchmark in four periods out of five from 1945 to 1999. Defense firms 
were found to be both more profitable and riskier than other firms that have the same 
market value. However, the difference is not statistically significant in any period. 
Further analysis to explain the difference in findings in this study and two others in 
the literature leads to the following conclusion. Neither changing the analysis period 
nor applying the analysis to firms in the largest deciles resulted in significant test 
statistics. These findings do not mean that defense firms did not earn excess returns 
in any sub-periods. Statistically significant positive excess returns were observed for 
the largest defense stocks during the periods 1952-1956 and 1976-1980.  
 
6.2 Results of the Analysis Examining the Impact of Regulatory Changes 
 
          As was shown in Table 6 empirical tests of the impact of each of the nine 
regulatory changes are organized around two null hypotheses. Tests of H1 measure 
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the average impact across sample firms, whereas tests of H2 measure allow for 
heterogeneity in reactions.  
         Table 23 summarizes the results of the tests of hypothesis 1. Summary statistics 
on individual parameter estimates are given in Table 24 to show the average effect 
and the extent of heterogeneity. Out of nine regulatory changes examined, only two 
resulted in statistically significant average abnormal returns. These regulations are 
Hoover Commission of 1949 and the Commission on Government Procurement of 
1972, which are significant at 5 % level. The percentage of the negative individual 
parameter estimates is 92 % in the former and 77 % in the latter. These results show 
that average reaction of sample firms have been negative and significant to these 
regulatory changes. The significance of z-statistics for these regulations implies that 
the findings are not driven by a small number of firms.  
          In general Hoover commission aimed to improve the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the acquisition process and emphasized centralization and 
simplification of the government procurement by giving more authority to the 
secretary of defense. Centralization process may reduce the problems related to 
coordination and increase the bargaining power of the government. Hoover 
commission was the first important effort to reform the acquisition process after 
World War 2.  As it was explained before, the period in which the commission was 
established can be called a suitable period for defense firms to earn excess profits. 
Such a reform had a considerable potential to reduce these excess profits. In these 
respects, the results are consistent with the expectations that the commission would 
have negative impact on defense stock returns. Unlike the case for the establishment 
month, no significant abnormal returns are found in the month when the report was 
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released. It seems that the market anticipated the motives and the requirements of the 
commission when the commission was established.  
        Commission on Government Procurement of 1972 aimed to provide a common 
basis for procurement policies and for the first time in the acquisition history 
recommended a shift toward commercial product acquisition. Some items procured 
by DOD had close commercial substitutes. Detailed specifications put by DOD was 
limiting the number of potential suppliers to DOD due to the economies of scale 
problem. The commission’s decision to encourage the purchase of commercial 
substitutes was a landmark approach in terms of increasing the level of competition 
in the defense industry. This is likely to reduce defense firms’ profits in an otherwise 
favorable period characterized by increased need for high tech weapon systems. The 
abnormal returns are significant for the month the report was released. It seems that 
the recommendations of the commission was more effective and binding than they 
had been expected.  
          The prominent character of the results of the tests of H2 is that sample firms 
reacted significantly to most of the regulatory changes. All first announcement 
months related to regulations resulted in significant abnormal returns. In general, in 
17 announcement months out of 21 examined, sample firms significantly reacted to 
the regulations. Not surprisingly, two regulations discussed above gave significant 
abnormal returns. For the others, rejection of H2 but not H1 indicates the existence 
of heterogeneity in reaction by sample firms. Excluding Hoover commission and 
Commission on Government Procurement, the maximum percentages of negative 
reactions for the regulations are 76%, 74% and 71 %, for TINA, Advisory panel and 
FASA, respectively. z-statistics are significant in those three regulations. It is likely 
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that positive reaction of a small number of firms washes out the negative reaction of 
other firms in the sample. That is why H2 but not H1 is rejected. For the rest of the 
regulations, the percentage of negative reaction does not exceed 62 % and varies 
between 32 % and 62 %. Not surprisingly, z-statistics are not significant. 
          In summary, defense firms reacted significantly to the regulatory changes. The 
reaction was homogeneous in only two of the regulatory changes: Hoover 
Commission and the Commission on Government Procurement. For others, reaction 
varied across firms. Some firms gained in market value while others lost.  
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TABLE 23 
Tests with monthly returns of the hypothesis that average excess returns equal 
zero 
 
Regulation 
  
Year N A t A1   A2   A3   
          Wald P Wald P Wald P 
Hoover 1949 13 2 22 
    
6.55* 0.0105 0.58 0.4500   
TINA 1962 17 2 37 2.15 0.1425 0.71 0.4000   
Commission 1972 24 2 4 0.2 0.6577  4.39* 0.0400   
Competition 1984 29 2 10 0.17 0.6802 0.10 0.7500   
Blue ribbon 1986 29 3 11 0.00 0.9806 0.11 0.7446 0.09 0.7680 
Advisory 1993 31 2 4 0.05 0.8173 2.11 0.1460   
NPR 1994 31 3 10 0.48 0.4881 0.18 0.6723   
FASA 1993 31 2 25 0.80 0.3701 0.00 0.9944 0.59 0.4435 
Clinger  1996 30 3 20 1.59 0.2070 1.3 0.25 2.74 0.098 
 
Note: N is the number of firms in the sample, A is the number of dummy variables 
(announcement months), t is the number of months from the first announcement month to 
the last announcement month, inclusive, A1, A2, and A3 represent the first, second and 
third announcement months, respectively. 
*  significant at the 5 % level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 72 
TABLE 24 
 
Results for the Individual Parameter Estimates (γ ia ) 
 
Regulation  Average % Negative z-statistic 
Hoover, A1 -0.0932 92% 3.0509 
 A2   -0.0281 69% 1.3868 
     
TINA, A1 -0.0465 76% 2.1828 
           A2 -0.0261 82% 2.6679 
     
Commission, A1 0.0154 54% 0.4082 
                      A2 -0.0804 75% 2.4495 
     
Competition, A1 0.0103 41% -0.9285 
                    A2 -0.0077 62% 1.2999 
     
Blue Ribbon, A1 -0.0006 55% 0.5571 
                     A2 0.0082 52% 0.1857 
 A3 0.0074 45% -0.5571 
     
Advisory, A1 0.0061 52% 0.1796 
                A2 -0.0405 74% 2.6941 
     
NPR, A1 0.0175 32% -1.9757 
 A2 -0.0107 68% 1.9757 
     
FASA, A1 0.0226 52% 0.1796 
 A2 0.0002 48% -0.1796 
 A3 -0.0195 71% 2.3349 
     
Clinger-Cohen, A1 0.0305 50% 0.0000 
 A2 0.0338 33% -1.8257 
 A3 -0.0444 77% 2.9212 
 
Note: A1, A2, and A3 represent the first, second and third announcement months, 
respectively. The z-statistic is given by 
)1( pMp
MpG
−
− , where G is the number of 
negative parameter estimates, M is the total number of parameter estimates, and p is 
the probability of a negative parameter estimate (0.50). 
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TABLE 25 
 
Tests with monthly returns of the hypothesis that all excess returns equal zero 
Regulation 
  
Year N A t A1   A2   A3   
          Wald P Wald P Wald P 
Hoover 1949 13 2 22 25.45* 0.0201 8.96 0.7800   
TINA 1962 17 2 37 49.10* 0.0001 8.51 0.9500   
Commission 1972 24 2 4 57.32* 0.0002 65.34* 0.0000   
Competition 1984 29 2 10 103.63* 0.0000 159.28* 0.0000   
Blue ribbon 1986 29 3 11 50.21* 0.0086 75.6* 0.0000 70.71* 0.0000 
Advisory 1993 31 2 4 100.43* 0.0000 97.16* 0.0000   
NPR 1993 31 3 10 57.46* 0.0027 33.57 0.3436   
FASA 1994 31 2 25 463.63* 0.0000 130.27* 0.0165 41.08* 0.0130 
Clinger 
  
1996 30 3 20 82.82* 0.0000 130.46* 0.0000 40.47 0.0960 
 
Note: N is the number of firms in the sample, A is the number of dummy variables 
(announcement months), t is the number of months from the first announcement month to 
the last announcement month, inclusive, A1, A2, and A3 represent the first, second and 
third announcement months, respectively. 
* significant at the 5 % level 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
          The purpose of this study is to analyze the relative performance of US defense 
firms by using stock price data over different time periods and examine the impact of 
regulatory changes within the event study framework. 
          In the defense acquisition history, regulatory changes were motivated by 
several factors. One factor is the perceived contractor waste, fraud and abuse that led 
to regulations regarding the contracting mechanism. Another factor is the efforts to 
centralize the acquisition decision-making process. This factor is motivated by the 
complexity and confusion surrounding the procurement system. Finally, some 
regulations were motivated by the desire to increase the competition in the 
acquisition environment. Regulations and reforms commonly aimed to reduce 
inefficiencies in defense procurement on which much public attention is focused. 
Large amount of money spent on defense procurement enhanced the concern with 
the relative profitability of defense firms. 
          The findings from the relative performance analysis can be summarized as 
follows: 
1. Defense firms are both more profitable and riskier than other firms that have 
similar market values. 
2. However, it appears that, within the five major sub periods (1945-1958, 
1958-1968, 1968-1980, 1980-1989, 1989-1999), the returns of the portfolio 
of defense stocks are not statistically different from the returns of the 
benchmark portfolio. 
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3. There is evidence that for specific and relatively short time periods like 1952-
1956 and 1976-1980, big defense firms were able reap excess profits. 
Regarding the second issue examined in this study, namely the impact of 
regulatory changes on defense stock returns, the major findings are as follows: 
1. Defense firms reacted significantly to the regulatory changes. The results 
imply that regulations related to acquisition process have considerable 
impacts on the gains of defense firms, either positive or negative. The result 
points to the importance of regulation in the defense industry. 
2. Only for two regulatory changes, tests that measure the average impact across 
firms resulted in significant average excess returns. Sample firms reacted 
negatively to these regulations. The results support the expectations that 
regulations emphasizing efficiency in acquisition process have a potential to 
reduce related firms’ future cash flows. Moreover, results imply that besides 
the nature of regulatory change, the political atmosphere and the general 
demand for weapons are also important. 
3. However, considerably few significant results of the tests that measure the 
average impact indicate that the reactions of firms varied across the sample, 
thus there is no homogeneity in the reactions of sample firms in most of the 
regulations. In the same industry, some firms gained while others lost.  
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